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Abstract 17 
Many developing countries face a major challenge today: how to safeguard the biodiversity 18 
maintained in the fields of the rural poor - which constitute a national and global public good - 19 
whilst meeting those same people's development needs and rights? A solution to this dilemma 20 
has thus been sought in adapting the design and implementation of Payments for Ecosystem 21 
Services (PES) concepts to the conservation of agrobiodiversity.  22 
Here we review the application of nine such Payments for Agrobiodiversity Conservation 23 
(PACS) schemes that have been applied to date in four Latin American countries over the 24 
period 2010-2018. These covered 130 threatened varieties across a number of major food crops, 25 
and involved over 100 farming communities and 1,100 farmers (45% of which were women). 26 
Conservation service offers were received through a competitive tender mechanism Average 27 
bid offers revealed high heterogeneity, varying between US$675/ha. to 10 times as much.  28 
In relation to issues identified as key to PES, such as spatial targeting, differentiated payments 29 
and conditionality, the underlying design of the PACS schemes may be considered solid. 30 
PACS-related prioritisation processes allow for the a priori identification of sites with high 31 
ecosystem service densities and high threat levels. The use of competitive tenders permits 32 
accounting for cost heterogeneity in the provision of conservation services and for payments 33 
to be differentiated. Conditionality is strong. 34 
 35 
In terms of implementation, a “back of the envelope” calculation based on the results of the 36 
competitive tenders suggests that conservation costs are modest. For a priority conservation 37 
portfolio of 100 varieties (which may be from different crops) each with a target area of five 38 
hectares, costs would amount to just under USD860,000 over twenty years or USD70,000 p.a. 39 
at a 5% discount rate. The small-scale and one-off nature of the interventions realised to date, 40 
along with threatened crop variety seed availability constraints, have however meant that 41 
environmental effectiveness has been incomplete in the short-term (increased area cultivated 42 
with specific threatened varieties, but still below the  “not at risk” threshold). The establishment 43 
of systematic monitoring systems is required to determine longer-term impacts and inform 44 
more regular PACS interventions within a dynamically evolving systems context. 45 
 46 
Keywords 47 
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1. Introduction 50 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) have been widely applied as incentive mechanisms to 51 
motivate natural resource conservation where important public good ecosystem service values 52 
exist, such as in the case of forests, water, wild biodiversity and landscape aesthetics (see 53 
Wunder et al 2018; Salzman et al 2018; and Börner et al., 2017 for recent overviews). 54 
Expanding over recent decades, there are now over 550 active PES programmes world-wide, 55 
with estimated transactions of US$36–42 billion p.a. (Salzman et al., 2018). However, 56 
relatively few of these are focussed on biodiversity conservation, yet alone agrobiodiversity1 57 
(ABD). For example, out of the 40 PES cases that Grima et al. (2016) identified for 58 
performance analysis purposes, half were focussed on water, 28% involved bundled ecosystem 59 
services, 12% landscape protection, 8% maintaining carbon stocks and just 2% biodiversity 60 
protection. 61 
 62 
While some of the largest public biodiversity PES programs are the agri-environment payment 63 
programs in the United States and Europe (Scherr et al., 2007), such applications in agriculture 64 
have been largely focussed on promoting more (wild) biodiversity- and ecosystem-friendly 65 
practices (Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003; and Lipper et al., 2009). With some rare exceptions, 66 
such as the EU support payments for threatened livestock breeds under Regulations 1257/99 67 
and 1750/99, the need to intervene to ensure that agricultural biodiversity per se is maintained 68 
has received much less attention (Narloch et al., 2011a; Pascual et al., 2103). This is despite 69 
the fact that high public good ecosystem service values (e.g. maintaining landscape resilience, 70 
food security and climate change adaptation potential) are associated with its in situ 71 
maintenance; while an unprecedented and irreversible loss of ABD continues unabated at 72 
ecosystem, species and genetic levels throughout the world, with threats to diversity getting 73 
stronger (among others, FAO 2010, 2015 and 2019).  74 
With a view to supporting implementation of a range of international agreements, sustainable 75 
development goals2 and national legislation, Bioversity International (now the  Bioversity- 76 
CIAT Alliance) and its partners have been leading the conceptual development and testing in 77 
a number of countries of “payments for agrobiodiversity conservation services” (PACS). PACS 78 
may be understood as a sub-category of agrobiodiversity-related PES that focuses on socially 79 
valuable and threatened local plant and animal genetic resources. Small-scale PACS schemes 80 
have been implemented for quinoa (Narloch et al. 2011a&b) in Peru and Bolivia, amaranth 81 
(Drucker et al., 2018) and potato in Peru, maize in Ecuador, and beans and maize in Guatemala 82 
(Padulosi and Drucker, 2018). Hypothetical applications have also been undertaken in India 83 
(Krishna et al., 2013) and Nepal (Pallante et al., 2016) for minor millets, and Zambia for crop 84 
wild relatives (Wainwright et al., 2019). This has led to the emergence of a body of work related 85 
to the application of the concepts of PES to the conservation of ABD per se. A range of related 86 
conservation and use management topics that contribute  to the broader PES literature have 87 
also been explored, such as: addressing distributional/social equity issues and accounting for 88 
local concepts of fairness (Narloch et al., 2012 and 2017; Midler et al., 2015); prioritisation 89 
(Samuel et al., 2013); conservation target setting, monitoring (Dulloo et al., 2016); facilitating 90 
value chain development (Pallante et al., 2016; Drucker and Appels, 2016); and identifying 91 
potential conservation service purchasers (Drucker et al., 2013). PACS may also be seen as an 92 
 
1 Biodiversity for food and agriculture or “agrobiodiversity” is a subcategory of biodiversity that corresponds to 
“the variety and variability of animals, plants and micro-organisms at the genetic, species and ecosystem levels 
that sustain the ecosystem structures, functions and processes in and around production systems, and that 
provide food and non-food agricultural products” (FAO, 2013 in FAO, 2019). 
2 Such as the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Aichi Targets 3 (Incentives) and 13 (Conservation of 
Diversity); Sustainable Development Goal 2 (Zero Hunger, including sustainable agriculture, food security, 
nutrition and the conservation of diversity ) and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) [Farmer’s Rights and the Fair & Equitable Sharing of Benefits]. 
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instrument for the de facto implementation of Farmers’ Rights (Clancy and Vernooy, 2014), 93 
by facilitating the sharing of benefits in a cost-effective manner with high levels of social 94 
justice and without having to depend on/wait for commercial product development. 95 
This paper provides a review of the main results and lessons learned from the experience 96 
gathered between 2010-2018 in Latin America (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Guatemala). 97 
Although globally applicable, the Americas has provided a particularly useful testing ground 98 
for the application of PES in the context of ABD conservation and use. It is a continent with 99 
high ecosystem service density, with seven countries classified as being megadiverse (UN-100 
WCMC, 2014) and the presence of millions of traditional farmers that maintain native 101 
agrobiodiversity on their farms. Furthermore, countries such as Peru, with well-developed 102 
regulatory frameworks in place, have been particularly keen on the adoption of PACS as a 103 
means of actively implementing national commitments under, inter alia, Peruvian Laws 26821 104 
(Conservation and Sustainable Use) and 30215 (Mechanisms for Payments for Ecosystem 105 
Services).  106 
With there now being results available across a range of crops and countries, and with Peru 107 
now implementing their first multi-year PACS schemes as part of a three year Global 108 
Environmental Facility “Sustainable Management of Agrobiodiversity” project across four 109 
regions, this paper aims to identify some timely key messages for future applications in Latin 110 
America and elsewhere.  111 
2. PACS Background 112 
The conceptual framework that connects the problem of loss of ABD and human wellbeing has 113 
been described in detail elsewhere (e.g. Pascual and Perrings, 2007; Drucker and Rodriguez, 114 
2007; Narloch et al., 2011a; Pascual et al 2013). It draws mostly on an economic perspective 115 
of the problem of the replacement of a valuable diverse existing pool of local plant and animal 116 
genetic resources with a smaller range of specialized improved ones - with such replacement 117 
taking place as part of a process of development through agricultural intensification that 118 
benefits individual actors at the expense of society at large. The existence of significant non-119 
market and/or public good values of plant and animal genetic resources, an overestimation of 120 
the performance of improved plant and animal genetic resources under less than ideal 121 
production system conditions and important intervention failures (e.g. subsidies that bias 122 
against traditional production systems) provide a strong justification for policy intervention. 123 
Such interventions would ensure that farmers undertaking de facto conservation through the 124 
maintenance of socially desirable levels of plant and animal genetic resources would be 125 
recognised and compensated for the national and global contributions they provide. 126 
 127 
PACS, like PES schemes more broadly, are based on a voluntary transaction of a well-defined 128 
service between at least one service provider and beneficiary, when the provider secures service 129 
provision (conditionality) [Wunder 2006 and 2007]. PACS creates the opportunity for farmers 130 
to no longer only sell an agricultural commodity, but also be rewarded for the provision of a 131 
conservation service for the good of society. Under PACS, farmers are rewarded for growing 132 
threatened genetic resources of high public good value; incentives are offered at community 133 
level and involve landscape-wide competitive tenders (spatial targeting concept). Groups 134 
define their participation conditions (i.e. which priority species/varieties to cultivate from a 135 
given portfolio, kind and level of reward needed, which farmers participate). Efficiency and 136 
social equity criteria (including gender) are then used by the project to select communities with 137 
the most attractive bids (payment differentiation concept) ideally up to the point that 138 
conservation targets are attained but in practice more commonly to the point that the 139 
conservation budget is fully expended. Conservation targets are based on a combination of 140 
variety areas (related to maintaining diversity, geneflow and evolutionary processes), as well 141 
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as in terms of numbers of farmers (related to traditional knowledge and cultural practices) and 142 
communities (related to spatial distribution/targeting and landscape resilience).  143 
Once communities have been contracted and seed distributed, compliance 144 
verification/monitoring (conditionality concept, effectiveness criteria) visits are carried out at 145 
certain key moments during the agricultural calendar (e.g. at the time of sowing, plant 146 
emergence, flowering, harvesting). This also provides opportunities for extension services to 147 
provide technical assistance and training (e.g. in quality seed selection), as well as undertake 148 
additional data collection. At harvest, the project keeps a small percentage (generally 2-5%) as 149 
seed for distribution to other farmers in following years. The in-kind rewards – for example, 150 
agricultural inputs, building and school materials - are subsequently handed-over at reward 151 
ceremonies. Such ceremonies have also provided opportunities for high visibility events, with 152 
the participation of vice ministers, and heads of national and local institutions, thereby 153 
supporting the mainstreaming of agrobiodiversity into national and regional (state) 154 
conservation policies and strategies (with regard to the Peru [Puno II] ceremony see Drucker, 155 
2016). Figure 1 provides an illustration of the overall PACS process. 156 
 157 
3. Method 158 
With a view to identifying the range of potential PACS scheme applications to be reviewed, a 159 
literature search was carried out on Google Scholar and ISI Web of Knowledge. Publications 160 
associated with agrobiodiversity-related PES remain extremely limited. Bioversity 161 
International-associated journal publications, conference presentations, briefs, blogs, 162 
webpages and unpublished project reports continue to be the main source of materials related 163 
to PACS and these materials were collated for review (see sources cited in Table 1). The 164 
selected case studies represent all of the Latin American experiences from 2010 initial piloting 165 
to 2018. Case studies from India and Nepal were considered beyond the scope of this review 166 
as they did not include actual implementation data, while that of Zambia focussed on crop wild 167 
relatives rather than landraces. 168 
 169 
The selected PACS scheme project sites are all located in some of the world’s most biodiverse 170 
countries and in areas specifically associated with a high diversity of crops and crop varieties 171 
of importance for food security and the livelihoods of the poor (see Figure 2). These areas are 172 
also located within globally important centres of origin for, inter alia, quinoa, amaranth, potato, 173 
maize, beans and cassava (all of which have been subject to a PACS intervention other than 174 
the latter). Such areas are associated with a wide cultural and ethnic diversity, as well as high 175 
levels of traditional knowledge. However, farm sizes are small and vulnerability to climate 176 
change high. Poverty rates (>85% in some areas) and chronic malnutrition are high, with 177 





Figure 2: Map of PACS 2010-2018 locations in Latin America 181 
 182 
Following prioritisation of the specific threatened crop varieties that are to be subjected to a 183 
PACS intervention (see below for further details), project sites within the above areas where 184 
such varieties used to be cultivated or continue to have a small presence were identified. In 185 
collaboration with national stakeholders (government extension agents, NGOs, university 186 
agricultural departments, etc.) communities within such project sites are notified about the 187 
existence of the PACS scheme, invited to participate in a training workshop and offered 188 
technical support for making a conservation service bid offer if they wish to do so. The sample 189 
population from which the tender results are drawn (through the application of a linear 190 
programming model, as per Wainwright et al, 2019) is thus self-selecting, at least within the 191 
proscribed project site/genetic resources catchment area. The same applies to the farmers who 192 
choose to participate within their community’s group bid offer, given that all farmers within 193 
the community are eligible to participate. 194 
 195 
All PACS schemes adhered to the generic approach described in the previous section. In terms 196 
of broader PES concepts, as identified by Wunder et al. (2018), strong conditionality (no group 197 
reward paid unless all members deliver the contracted conservation service) was applied, with 198 
regular compliance verification and monitoring visits taking place between planting and 199 
harvesting. All cases also involved the potential to account for spatial differentiation and social 200 
equity/distributive considerations, which along with the use of group-level rewards paid in-201 
kind rather than in cash contribute to the innovative nature of these PES-type schemes.  202 
 203 
The largest differences between the application of the different PACS schemes were in fact 204 
related to the prioritisation process informing site selection. Identification of the varieties to be 205 
subjected to the PACS interventions were identified through prioritisation exercises involving 206 
expert opinion including from genebank curators (Bolivia and Peru [Puno I]), the application 207 
of a Weitzman approach (Peru [Puno II]; Kost, 2016), as well as the 4 Cell Method (Ecuador 208 
and Guatemala; as per Sthapit et al., 2006). Method choice in practice was determined by data 209 
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availability (e.g. existence and access to ex situ characterisation data in the case of Weitzman) 210 
and time/funding constraint considerations. In prioritising, a range of factors were considered, 211 
such as distinctiveness, threat status, importance for climate change adaption, food security and 212 
livelihoods.  213 
 214 
4. Results  215 
As can be seen in Table 1, PACS have been applied to date in four Latin American countries, 216 
covering five commodity crops (quinoa, amaranth, potato, maize and beans) plus a number of 217 
others and leading to interventions on over 130 threatened crop varieties. While not all invited 218 
communities ultimately chose to do so, 156 communities involving over 1,600 farmers and 164 219 
hectares submitted conservation service bid offers.  220 
 221 
Reward payments were funded through specific projects, as well as more recently with in-kind 222 
and cash support from regional governments and the private sector, respectively. As all the 223 
applications to date have been small-scale, with total payment budgets being just under 224 
USD7,000 on average, only about 70% of these offers (109 communities and 1,114 farmers) 225 
and just under half (47%) of the offered land area (77 hectares) could be selected to participate 226 
in the conservation activities. However, there is a large variation between the PACS schemes, 227 
with Peru, Apurimac, and Ecuador I&II taking a strong egalitarian approach and selecting 228 
100% of the bid offers; while the Peru (Puno II) quinoa scheme was only able to select about 229 
20% of the offers made with the budget available.  230 
 231 
On average, just under half of the selected farmers were female (45.5%), although this also 232 
varied significantly between schemes from a low of 5% in Chiquimula, Guatemala to 93% 233 
under the Ecuador I PACS scheme. Post-project intervention satisfaction has generally been 234 
high amongst farmers (for details of assessments of the 2010/11 experiences in Bolivia and 235 
Peru, including farmer quotes, see Drucker et al., 2015 pp.25-26) 236 
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Table 1: Overview of Latin American Payments for Agrobiodiversity Conservation Services Schemes Applications 











































1) Bolivia (Uyuni)a 
2010/2011 
Quinoa 5 4,000 12/N.A. 6/42 8.0/25.8 22% 120-3,571             500           95.24 
2) Peru (Puno I)a 
2010/2011 
Quinoa 4 4,000 13/N.A 6/41 1.45/7.46 45% 2,272-10,573          2,759           97.56 
3) Peru (Puno II) 
2015/2016 
Quinoa 5 4,200 30/370 6/45 11.82/63.07 64% 95-29,044             355           93.33 
4) Peru (Cusco)b 
2017/18 
Amaranth 54**  9,100 25/416 16/223 3.08/12.01 40% 758 – 6,060          2,955           40.81 
5) Peru (Apurimac) 
2017/18 
















Maize (plus other 
crops such as potato, 
sweet potato, mashua 
and beans) 




Maize (plus other 
crops as above as 
well as lentil, carrot 
and yam) 
17^ 7,100 22/127 22/127* 15.9/15.9 79% 467             447           56
 Total >128 156/>1,627 109/1,114 77.3/164.4   
 Average  6,939   45.5% 678 – 6,724 1,196             57 
N.A.: Data not available; *All offers selected and, in the case of Ecuador, offers were identical; ** number of accessions, not all of which are from distinct varieties. 
Consequently, have not been included in varietal total below, resulting in a sub-estimate; # Offers received for six varieties but seed available only for four; & Bid offers 
received for 11 varieties but offers selected covered only nine; ^Eight of which were the same as under Ecuador I.. Source: Drucker et al., 2017 and/or Bioversity project 





5.1 Differentiated payments and cost-effectiveness 
The use of competitive tenders among potential PES conservation service providers is often 
seen as potentially complex and expensive to organize, although the evidence for this within 
PACS is limited (more on transaction costs below). Rather, the experience has been that, as 
predicted by theory, they are highly effective in revealing provider costs. The PACS schemes 
revealed a wide range of bid offers (USD 95 – 29,000/ha p.a.), with the average over the nine 
schemes varying between USD 678 – 6,724/ha. p.a.  
 
The bid ranges allow conservation service supply curves to be constructed per variety in terms 
of area, as well as in terms of goals related to numbers of participating farmers and 
communities. For examples of the different PACS supply curves associated with Bolivia and 
Peru (Puno I) see Narloch et al. (2011b p.4). It is particularly interesting to note that farmers 
reveal very different preferences for different traditional varieties, as expressed through their 
bid offers. A range of different market (e.g. yield, ease of sale) and non-market values (e.g. 
taste, preparation time, cultural/ritual uses), as perceived by farmers, is likely to explain such 
differences. Elsewhere it has been shown that consumption values rather than production ones 
can play an important role in driving bid offers (e.g. Krishna et al. 2013). In some cases, the 
cost of in situ on farm conservation of a particularly expensive variety suggests that an 
alternative (i.e. not on farm) conservation strategy for that variety is needed. 
 
The top end of such bid ranges (i.e. $29,000/ha.) clearly exceed any opportunity cost measures 
of production that might exist and may be considered as outliers. These bids may have resulted 
from inexperienced tender participants making uncompetitive bids (e.g. a tractor requested in 
exchange for the conservation offer of a very small land area) and others may simply not have 
been interested in non-commercial variety production. However, those at the lower end of the 
range are particularly interesting. They demonstrate that, given modest conservation goals, 
there may well be a sufficiently large pool of lower cost farmers (i.e. the motivated sellers key 
for upscaling, as per Salzman et al., 2018) at the bottom end of the supply curves who could be 
attracted to participate under upscaled projects that cover larger numbers of communities. 
 
Overall, the existence of significant heterogeneity in farmer willingness to participate (except 
for those in Ecuador, where strong egalitarian principles would appear to apply) suggests that 
any additional costs or complexities associated with tender approaches may well be worth 
incurring. In any case, from an up-scaling perspective small-scale tenders of the type being 
realised could be used first as a research tool, to then guide the subsequent selection of proxies 
for price differentiation at larger scales of implementation, as noted by Wunder et al. (2018).  
 
5.2 Environmental Effectiveness 
Environmental effectiveness has been slower to achieve than originally anticipated not only by 
the small scale and limited duration (usually a single agricultural season) of the PACS 
interventions, but in many cases by seed availability as well. 
 
With the exception of Peru (Puno II), which had the opportunity to select up to 63 hectares for 
conservation purposes, none of the PACS applications in Table 1 were sufficiently large to 
attract or have selected enough bids to reach an area conservation target of five hectares per 
variety. For example, under Peru (Puno I), the four varieties in question could only be 
conserved on 1.45 hectares in total. Similarly, under Guatemala [Huehuetenango] nine varieties 
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could be conserved on only 5.3 hectares in total. Other varieties met a lower conservation 
target? of between 1-2 hectares (e.g. under Peru [Puno I] and Guatemala [Chiquimula]). 
 
Even in the case of Peru (Puno II), reaching the conservation target for all five varieties would 
have required a budget of approximately US$19,100 (equivalent to US$750/ha) .Given that the 
budget available was only $4,200, this meant that less than 20% of the offers could be accepted, 
resulting in the Ccoito and Chulpi Real quinoa varieties conservation contracts falling just short 
of the target with 4.2-4.7 hectares and the others falling well short. However, in the following 
year, thanks to the intervention of Kai Pacha Foods (Wankel and Hethcote, 2017) – a motivated 
private sector buyer - the latter did reach the conservation target and has now been declared 
“not at risk” by the Ministry of the Environment. 
 
In other cases, conservation targets could not be reached not because of limited budgets but 
rather as a result of insufficient seed availability. For example, only 250g per accession were 
available under the Peru (Amaranth) intervention. In Guatemala [Chiquimula] although bid 
offers were received for the San Jacinto and Chibolo bean varieties, the project was unable to 
obtain any seed at all for those varieties. Such experiences suggest that reaching conservation 
targets may require several years of building up the genetic resource base, including through 
purification and multiplication activities. This issue (which may also be viewed as a type of 
transaction cost) of the importance of access to seeds of threatened varieties is also reflected in 
the PACS experience in Cotacachi, Ecuador. Unlike Peru, the only rewards requested for 
conservation activities were access to the seed in question and an appropriate amount of 
fertilizer. It has also been interesting to note that farmers selected an equal approach to 
participation, with all farmers asking for the same amount of seeds and fertilizers per unit of 
land. 
 
5.3) Conditionality, compliance verification and monitoring systems 
Conditionality (i.e. the combined sequential effort put into monitoring and sanctioning of non-
compliance) is seen as a fundamental conceptual element of PES (Wunder et al., 2018) and 
plays an important role in the PACS schemes. Conservation service contracts between the 
conservation project/agency and the participating community groups clearly specify that the 
agreed in-kind group reward will only be paid at the end of the contract if all members of the 
group have satisfactorily fulfilled their obligations. Should this not be the case, nobody in the 
group is rewarded. Such a peer-pressure compliance mechanism is combined with a series of 
visits during key moments of the agricultural season to the participating communities for 
compliance verification, monitoring and technical assistance purposes. This has resulted in 
high compliance rates, with all participants fulfilling their obligations with the exception of 
one case in 2010. In that particular case, a number of farmers in the group had decided not to 
plant the threatened quinoa varieties they had contracted to cultivate. Other farmers in the group 
instead made up for their reduced service provision, thus ensuring that the overall group did 
not need to be sanctioned.  
 
Post intervention monitoring visits have been less frequent. They are urgently needed to not 
only inform the varietal focus of subsequent interventions (given that each round of PACS only 
covers a given proportion of the threatened genetic resources that have been prioritised for 
conservation), but also to evaluate longer-term effectiveness in the absence of further 
interventions. As part of its spatial targeting, the PACS selection process purposefully seeks 
out those farmers with the high preferences for cultivating traditional varieties (as expressed 
by their bid offers at the lower end of the supply curves). It is therefore perhaps unsurprising 
that many retain part of their harvest as seed for the following agricultural seasons regardless 
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of whether there will be any further direct incentives to cultivate it. This degree of post-
intervention “persistence” is important, as it is a major factor in determining when re-
interventions are needed to maintain specific varieties above an “at risk” threshold (within a 
dynamic systems context) and hence overall conservation programme costs over time.  
 
Evidence from Lavoie et al. (2017) is encouraging. In a visit to Peru (Puno I) communities, 
persistence rates were shown to be between 30-50% five years after the single year PACS 
intervention had finished. Furthermore, 83% of farmers declared that they would be willing to 
participate in further PACS activities, even without receiving rewards, provided they would be 
given access to the seeds of the threatened varieties. 
 
Unfortunately, few countries in the world, if any, are currently collecting baseline and 
monitoring data appropriate for indicating when such re-interventions might be required. Such 
data would also be useful for other ABD management purposes such as pre-intervention 
prioritization and post-intervention impact assessment. Additionally, such monitoring data 
would allow the varietal focus of PACS interventions to be refreshed over time, as PACS 
interventions result in some varieties reaching a “not at risk” status, with others in the 
conservation portfolio thus moving up the priority list (including in the unlikely event of any 
leakage/PACS-induced displacement having taken place). Monitoring systems could also be 
used to allow seed exchange networks to be mapped and supported. Given that the type of data 
required (variety areas and their spatial distribution, number of farmers, availability and 
viability of seeds, etc.), such data would have to be collected in a participatory manner 
(alongside more conventional approaches), thereby generating opportunities to organize and 
even reward communities for collecting monitoring data that has an important public value (a 
type of PES for data collection). 
 
5.4) Facilitating Access to Seed 
In addition to the challenges of developing the institutional, technical and resource capacities 
required to implement PACS schemes,  a further key challenge during the first few years of 
intervention is the lack of  access to the seeds of the species/varieties that have been identified 
as a priority for intervention (as they are by definition threatened and rare).  
 
There is thus an urgent need for support for threatened variety seed multiplication, purification, 
storage and dissemination/exchange. With regard to storage, elsewhere, in similar contexts, 
community seed banks have been shown (including under the Guatemala ASOCUCH PACS 
application) to be capable of providing a critical platform around which community-based 
conservation incentive mechanisms may be developed, while simultaneously addressing the 
current scarcity of (high public value) traditional species/variety seed  and post-harvest storage 
(Vernooy et al., 2017). PACS rewards may also be used to promote seed sharing (e.g. 
rewarding farmers who share seed with at least two other farmers). 
 
5.5. Conservation Costs 
The PACS schemes have also generated useful cost data with which to undertake “back of the 
envelope” calculations and inform broader conservation strategy. Modelling of the total and 
annualised present costs is carried out on the basis of the following factors and assumptions: 
• the number of varieties to be conserved 
• the percentage of varieties that will need repeated intervention (60%, i.e. a persistence rate 
of 40%) and the frequency under which such repeat interventions are required (every 5 
years) [as per Lavoie et al., 2017] 
11 
 
• the conservation target (five hectares per variety spread across 50-100 farmers) [Bioversity 
International, 2015] 
• the cost per hectare 
• monitoring, compliance verification and administration costs (20% of total cost, given that 
implementation and transaction cost3 estimates from other PES applications range from 
1%-25% and have been shown to be sensitive to the scale of implementation [(MAFF, 2000 
pp.96–97; Slangen et al., 2008, pp.204-205]) 
• a discount rate (5%) and 
• an analytical time horizon of 5-50 years (shorter time periods have lower total present costs 
but spread over fewer years result in higher annualised equivalents). 
 
In Table 1, we noted that average bid offers per hectare were in the range of approximately 
USD670 to a value of ten times as much. For each priority portfolio of 100 varieties and 
assuming that the area target for each variety can be achieved with the participation of a 
sufficient number of farmers at the bottom end of that range, then conservation costs over a 20-
year time horizon would amount to just under USD860,000 or USD70,000 p.a. at a 5% discount 
rate (see Table 2). Of course, if target areas can only be achieved by moving further up the 
conservation service supply curves and accepting higher average bids, then the costs will be 
proportionally more. 
 
Table 2: Present Costs for Conserving a 100 Variety Priority Portfolio under a Five 
Hectare Area per Variety Conservation Target 
Average Cost/ha (USD) 670 
Time Horizon (years) Total Present Cost (US$) Annualised Present Cost (US$) 
5                          382,857                         88,430   
10                          624,057                         80,818   
20                          857,217                         68,785   
50*                          989,877                         54,222   
#Total Present Cost is the current worth of the (discounted) stream of future costs over the 
number of years indicated 
& Annualised Present Cost is the total present cost expressed as an annuity 
*At a persistence rate of 40%, no further interventions are in fact required after year 46. Thus, 
extending the time horizon further leaves total present costs unchanged, while reducing the 
annualised present costs to approximately US$50,000 p.a. 
 
While high persistence/low re-intervention rates can help to keep costs down, it is also 
important to note that the above conservation cost calculations are particularly sensitive to the 
assumptions regarding such persistence/re-intervention rates, as well as to the number of 
varieties that require intervention and the size of the conservation target (all of which are likely 
to be highly context specific). Nonetheless, the annual conservation costs identified above 
represent only a tiny percentage of the gross production value of even just quinoa in Peru 
(USD93.4m in 2016, [FAOSTAT]).   
 
 
3 Future research to quantify upscaled PACS implementation transaction costs would be useful. The small-scale 
nature of PACS scheme implementation to date has resulted in fixed support costs that, where documented at all 
(e.g. Drucker et al., 2015) although small nonetheless represent a high proportion of the total value of the 
payments. However, these are unlikely to be representative of larger PACS projects where such costs would be 




5. Conclusions:  
The application of PES concepts to the on farm conservation of agrobiodiversity has led to the 
development of a Payments for Agrobiodiversity Conservation Services (PACS) research and 
development platform that has been tested and applied on a small-scale across a number of 
countries and crops in Latin America.  
 
Such experiences suggest that PACS has the potential to play an important role in the 
implementation of upscaled in situ on farm agrobiodiversity conservation programmes, 
including as a mechanism for putting Farmers’ Rights into practice; and to do so in a cost-
effective and socially-equitable way. Farmers may be rewarded not only for their conservation 
services per se (i.e. cultivation of threatened varieties with high public good values) but also 
for related services, such as seed sharing and generating monitoring data. 
 
Key messages for those upscaling PACS are that there are indeed a large number of motivated 
conservation service sellers (i.e. farmers) willing to provide such services at modest cost. 
Although the compliance rates of those contracted to do so are high, facilitating their access to 
threatened crop variety seed has been challenging. This has in turn limited (or at least slowed) 
short-term environmental effectiveness. Systematic monitoring systems are required to 
determine longer-term environmental effectiveness and orient intervention strategies within a 
context of changing varietal risk statuses. 
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1a) Definition of a Priority 
conservation portfolio 
1c) Identification of Priority Genetic Resources for Intervention in 
upcoming agricultural season, including based on risk threshold 
assessment 
1b) Availability of sufficient seed 
of the threatened genetic 
resources identified for 
intervention 
3) Realization of Farmer Workshops 
(announcement of existence of conservation 
tender and how to participate) 
4) Community Visits to support informed 
bid offers and collect offers from those 
communities interested in participating 
5) Selection of bid offers, 
announcement of winning bids 
and drawing up on contracts 
 
7) Seed handover event and 
signing of conservation contracts 
8) Current PACS contract 
community monitoring, force 
majeure verification and socio-
economic data collection visits 
11) Community seed 
delivery collection visit 
12 ) Rewards Handover 
Ceremony 
6) Purchase or Obtain Seed 
 
2) Confirmation of sufficient funds 
to pay farmer rewards at end of 
agricultural season 
 
9) Contract verification visits 
1) Prioritization Process 
10) Previous PACS contract 
community monitoring visits 
Figure 1: Flowchart of PACS Stages during the Agricultural Season 
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7) Seed handover event and 
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8) Current PACS contract 
community monitoring, force 
majeure verification and socio-
economic data collection visits 
